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Draft of article published in FDI Perspectives (Feb 2012) by the 
Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment 
The (lack of) women arbitrators in investment treaty arbitration 
Gus Van Harten* 
Investment arbitration has a remarkably poor record on representation of women. This calls for reform of 
the appointments process for arbitrators, who make important policy choices in the context of global 
governance. 
In 249 known investment treaty cases until May 2010, there were 631 appointments. Of these, 41 were 
appointments of women -- just 6.5% of all appointments. Worse, of the 247 individuals appointed as 
arbitrators across all cases, only 10 were women. Women thus comprised 4% of those serving as 
arbitrators. 
The story is also almost entirely that of two women, Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and Brigitte Stern, who 
together captured 75% of appointments of women. In contrast, the two most frequently appointed men 
accounted for 5% of the 593 appointments of male arbitrators (for more on the data, see the website 
version of this Perspective). 
Representation of women is important, not because women would necessarily make different choices than 
men, but because arbitrators who make decisions of public importance should reflect the make-up of 
those affected by their decisions. Representation of women is among the most obvious components of this 
principle. Reflecting this, states have well-established obligations to take appropriate measures to ensure 
equality between women and men and to afford women the same employment opportunities as men.1 
To their credit, a few states appear to have driven appointments of women arbitrators. These include 
Argentina (5 women of 29 appointments), Turkey (2 of 6), the United States (2 of 9), Bolivia (1 of 2), and 
Georgia (1 of 2). 
On the whole, though, the system’s performance has been abysmal. By comparison, women have been 
much better represented among international (and many domestic) judiciaries. For example, women made 
up 32% of European Court of Human Rights appointees (26 of 82 judges) since 1995 and 19% of 
Appellate Body members (4 of 21 members) in WTO history. Incidentally, on a perusal of the data, the 
system’s record on racial and regional representation also appears poor. 
The record thus gives reason to doubt the existing appointments process in international investment 
arbitration. Based on that process -- which is ad hoc, partly-privatized and conducted under acute 
litigation pressure -- men have devoured the opportunities. 
Although not the only option, a direct and practical solution is to adopt a mandatory roster system. This 
would permit a publicly accountable and deliberative process of appointments, free from the strategic 
pressures that arise after a dispute has been registered. It would also enable more detached attention by 
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1 CEDAW Convention, Articles 3 and 11b. 
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states to representation, including ways to overcome possible barriers to participation by women, such as 
the concentration of men in major law firms or differential family responsibilities of women. 
Likewise, a roster system would improve quality, if based on an open and merit-based process, including 
consultation with investor organizations and other interest groups. Advice on suitable candidates could be 
sought from organizations such as the International Association of Women Jurists, the International 
Federation of Women Lawyers, or Arbitral Women. Besides tapping the knowledge and networks of 
these organizations, involving them directly would help loosen the hold of the boys’ club. If the roster 
itself did not achieve this end, then states could move to mandatory representation of particular groups on 
the roster. 
Importantly, a roster system would enhance the independence and public accountability of the system, 
especially if all arbitrators had to be selected from the roster (preferably by lottery or rotation). Related to 
this, the roster would need to be kept to a reasonable size (unlike the ICSID roster) in order to ensure a 
reasonable distribution of appointments among its members. 
Alternative options to enhance representation appear less effective or less comprehensive. For example, 
one could introduce annual quotas for the appointing bodies under the treaties, but this would require 
acceptance by a range of public and private bodies or would depend on a claimant’s choices of arbitration 
rules. Also, this alternative would cover only some presiding members of tribunals and very few, if any, 
party-appointed arbitrators. 
On the other hand, a roster could be designed to cover all investment treaty arbitrations based on a 
separate agreement to clarify or supersede existing investment treaties. An expert advisory body could be 
charged with recommending candidates based on merit. Further, to avoid possible frustration of the roster 
by one or a few states, an ultimate decision-maker -- such as the President of the International Court of 
Justice -- could be designated as the final appointing authority. 
To summarize, the reliance on ad hoc appointments by the disputing parties has failed to ensure adequate 
representation of women. A mandatory roster would permit states to address this directly. It would also 
enhance public accountability and independence by giving states the responsibility to select those eligible 
for appointment and by providing a degree of secure tenure for the arbitrators. 
Of course, there would be challenges in designing and implementing a roster system. But, as an outside 
observer, I see no clearer way to address this and other problems plaguing the status quo. 
Appendix – Appointments of women arbitrators in known investment treaty cases, to May 2010 
Note: Data were collected from all known investment treaty cases that had led, by May 1, 2010, to a 
confirmed award on jurisdiction or, in the case of the North American Free Trade Agreement, to the filing 
of a notice of claim. The data track changes in tribunal membership at the stage of the establishment of a 
tribunal, an award on jurisdiction, an award on the merits, and an award on damages. In some cases, it 
was not possible to identify who was appointed as arbitrator based on publicly available primary 
documents. 
Arbitrator Appointment history Total
appointments 
Giuditta Cordero Moss Bogdanov v Moldova (sole arbitrator) 1 
Susana Czar de Zaluendo Vieira v Chile (investor) 1 
Tatiana de Maekelt LG&E v Argentina (presiding) 1 
3 
Merit E. Janow Mobil v Canada (unconfirmed) 1 
Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler Saipem v Bangladesh (presiding) 
Chemtura v Canada (presiding) 
Burlington Resources v Ecuador (presiding) 
Duke Energy v Ecuador (presiding) 
Noble Energy v Ecuador (presiding) 
Jan de Nul v Egypt (presiding) 
Bayinder v Pakistan (presiding) 
Austrian Airlines v Slovakia (presiding) 
AWG v Argentina (investor) 
CGE/ Vivendi v Argentina (No 2) (investor) 
EDF v Argentina (investor) 
Suez & InterAguas v Argentina (investor) 
Suez & Vivendi v Argentina (investor) 
Mobil v Venezuela (investor) 
PSEG v Turkey (state) 
Quiborax v Bolivia (unconfirmed, presumed presiding) 
Vattenfall v Germany (unconfirmed) 
17 
Carolyn Lamm ADF v United States (state) 1 
Lucinda Low CCFT v United States (state) 1 
Sandra Morelli Rico Anderson v Costa Rica (presiding) 
Sempra v Argentina (state) 
Camuzzi v Argentina (No 1) (state) 
3 
Fern M. Smith Apotex v USA (unconfirmed) 1 
Brigitte Stern  Pheonix Action v Czech Republic (presiding) 
BP America v Argentina (state) 
El Paso v Argentina (state) 
Pan American v Argentina (state) 
Burlington Resources v Ecuador (state) 
Occidental Petroleum v Ecuador (No 2) (state) 
Jan de Nul v Egypt (state) 
Alapli Electrik v Turkey (state) 
Vannessa Ventures v Venezuela (state) 
Barmek v Azerbaijan (unconfirmed) 
Quiborax v Bolivia (unconfirmed, presumed state) 
Itera v Georgia (unconfirmed, presumed state) 
Gustav Hamester v Ghana (unconfirmed) 
AES Summit v Hungary (No 1) (unconfirmed, presumed 
state) 
14 
Total appointments: 631 
Men: 590 
Women: 41 (16 state, 7 investor, 13 presiding, 5 unknown) 
